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decision making

One particularly ubiquitous demonstration of the essential relativity of human judgment is the anchoring effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) – the assimilation of a numeric estimate towards a previously considered standard. Such anchoring effects pervade a plethora of judgments, from the mundane (e.g., estimates of the freezing point of vodka) to the apocalyptic (e.g., estimates of the likelihood of nuclear war). Such anchoring effects occur so natural That they are even engaged with anchor values that are not consciously perceived (Mussweiler & Englich, 2005). In our research, we examined the psychological mechanisms that underlie such anchoring effects (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999; 2000, 2001; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). Furthermore, we applied these insights into the underlying mechanisms to one applied domain of human judgment in which anchoring effects have particularly drastic and disconcerting effects, namely legal decision making. This research demonstrates that sentencing decisions of experienced legal experts are influenced by sentencing demands which serve as numerical anchors (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001). In fact, this influence even holds if sentencing demands were determined at random (Englich, Mussweiler, Strack, 2006). Because in most legal systems the prosecution is allowed to set the first sentencing anchor, this puts the defendant at a distinct disadvantage (Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2005). These findings stand in marked contrast to the in dubio pro reo principle.